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INsuneNcE CoNSUMER CouNsEL's ColutvtN
Tnn CesB AcerNst MoNt¡.Ne's ANtr-STacKrNG Stetutn
¡ y PRo¡'rssoR Gaac Mulvao
It would be hard to identify a
larger loss to insurance consulners
in Montana than that dealt the pub-
lic the day the 1997 Iægislature
passed the "anti-stacking" billl now
codified as MC,\ $33-23-203 and
known as the "anti-stacking stat-
ute." W'hen that law took effect,
families with four cars suddenly had
one-quarter of the automobile'UM,
UIM, and Med Pay coverages they
had before the effective date but
still paid the same premiums.
Before the 1,997 stahrte, con-
surners in Montana could stack their
auto insurance when they paid pre-
miums for coverage on more than
one car. The Supreme Court had
been doing so since 1972 when it
stacked UM coverages from dlffer-
ent carriers tn SullÍuan v. Doe.2 In
I(emp v. Allstate fns. Co.r3'rr,t
1979,the court established that you
could stack multiple UM coverages
under separate policies with the
silrìe company, and in Chaffee v.
U.S. Fid, & Guar. Co.,a held you
could stack coverage for multiple
cars under the same policy.
When the insurance industry
secured passage of the Frrst "anti-
stacking" bills in 1981, it only blocked
stacking where multiple vehicles
were insured under the same policy.
The 1981 stâtute was later held, in
Farmers AIIíance Mut. fns. Co. v.
Ifolemanrí to apply only to com-
pulsory coverages of Bodily Injury
Liability and Uninsured Motorist.
The statute did not block stacking
of Medical Pzy covetage and Under-
insured Motoris t coverage.
It is important to note the dif-
ferent choices auto insurers made
when covering multiple vehicles in
Montana in the years after the 1981
stâtute took effect. State Farm
placed an insured's multiple vehicles
under separate policies and collected
separate premiums, while Farmers
Insurancõ Company placed ù in-
sured's multiple vehicles under the
same policy collecting separate pre-
miums. On the other hand, USF&G
and Allstate placed multiple vehicles
under the same policy but report-
edly charged a single premium for
UM coverage. USF&G and Allstate
heeded the court's oft repeated rea-
soning that if the insurer chatged
multiple premiums, the insured
would be entitled to multiple cover-
ages. On the other end of the mar-
keting spectrum, State Farm contjn-
ued to charge multiple premiums
and never sought the benefit ofthe
1981 anti-stacking statute, since it
placed each vehicle under a separate
polic¡ a practice to which the star-
ute did not apply.T
It was in the context of this
roughly two-decade stacking history
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that the 1997 Iægislature mandated
that regatdless of the number of
policies issued, the number of vehi-
cles insured or the number of pre-
miums paid, coverages could not be
stacked to provide the consumer
any benefit for the additional ptemi-
ums they were charged for multiPle
vehicles. The legisla-
ture's act would
prove to hàve a. càIas-
uophic impact on
families of those
maimed and killed in
auto accidents in
Montana. Without a
doubt, ¡}re 1997 anti-stacking stahrte
is the number one problem faced by
plaintiffs'counsel in Montana in at-
tempting to secure adequate com-
pensation for clients' iniuries arising
out of the operation of automobiles.
By May of L998, the last of the
stackable policies expired and it was
counsel's job to tell families of those
who suffered severe injury or death
ìn auto accidents and owned multi-
ple vehicles that only a fractton of
the coverage for which they paid
wzs zvailable to compensate them.
The brutal economics of the
7997 antt-stacking statute, which
prohibits consurners from obtaining
the benefit of multiple coverages for
which they paid while allowing in-
surers awindfall by permitting them
to collect multiple and ever-
increasing premiums for no cover-
age, compelled cotrnsel to attack the
statute. In the last threei years, many
members of the MontarnTÅalLa'w-
yers Association have filed chal-
lenges to the statute and its applica-
tion. The most ftequent questions I
field today are: What is happening
to the anti-stacking stahrte? Is there
anything filed at the Supteme
Cout? Have any district court deci-
sions come down? What ate lawyers
arguing in the attacks on the statute?
What are the best challenges?
Consequently, using MTLA's
listserve, I invited members to in-
form me of their stacking cases and
send copies of theit briefs, and sev-
eral members did so. In this article,I
will give a status repoft on those cases
that have been reported as being frled
and briefed. I will then set out â syn-
opsis of arguments that have been
developed by MTLA members. Please
note that this is a compendium of
those cases reported to me, and there
STATUS OF REPORTED
STACKING CASES FILED
AND BRIEFED
Cameton v. State .Farm fns.
Co., (Summary judgment decision
pending) MTLA memberJoe Bot-
tomly, Eleventh Judicial District, Flat-
head County Cause No. DV-99-250
(B)
Charles Cameron and his wife,
Cindy, insured separate vehicles under
separâte State Farm policies. Cindy
Cameron was killed, while Chades
and his infant son Daniel suffered se-
rious injuries in a head-on collision of
truo Ford Explorers near Ovando,
Montana on November 28,1998.
State Farm refused to stack the UM,
UIM, or Med Pay coverages of
Chades's pickup truck, which was
not involved in the accident. Joe
Bottomly frled and briefed the case
on suûìmarT judgment. The brief is
excellent contarung
manywell-
developed argu-
ments that will be
the basis of much
that follows. Unfor-
tunatel¡ the case
has languished with-
out decision in Flathead County fot
over 18 months. Bottomly's brief
will be placed on the MTLAweb-
site.
Farmets Alliance Mut. V.
Ifancoclç (Settled) Fifteenth Judi-
cial District, Sheridan County,
Cause 10913. MTLA members
Gene Jarussi and Russ Plath, along
with lawyers Laura Christofferson
and Loren Toole all f,rled briefs in
support of motions to stack.
This was a head-on collision
onJune 25,1998, in which an SUV
driven by Marilyn Smith crossed the
centerline north of Medicine Lake,
Montana collidingwith a, cÀr carry-
ing five young baseball players on
their way to a baseball toumament.
Two baseball players were killed
and three severely injured. For sepa-
rate premiums and under the same
policy, Farmers Alliance Mutua-l
covered the car in which the five
were riding and a separate car fot
$300,000 UIM limits. Farmers Alli-
ance sued for declaration that they
only owed one coverage and moved
for summary judgment. Judge Cy-
bulski ded in favor of the insureds
and stacked the coverages ding
that the insurer's anti-stacking limi-
tation of liability clause was not a
"reasonable limitation" as required
by the statute. The carrier appealed
to the Montana Supreme Court, and
the case was settled before briefing
there.
Copies of the btiefs refetenced in thís atticle ate
avaÍlable on MTLA's website at www.montda.com
are bound to be others about which I
am uninformed or have forgotten be-
cause they were reported to me orally
at MTLA seminars. Because of space
limitations, I will not treat opposing
arguments or the non-stacking issues
such as offsets lhat arc argued in our
members'briefs. I want the writers of
these f,rne briefs to know how diffi-
cult I found the task of selecting syn-
thesizing zccuntely dþsting and
appropriately attributing these argu-
ments given our space limitations. I
hope they will forgive me if aggrieved
by 
-y many attempts to abridge their
fine efforts to meet space considera-
tions here. Finally, I have selected
only the arguments that appear to me
to be viable for development. I have
not included or corntnented on other
fine arguments that are fact specific
or made in difficult fact situations.
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Gotoskí v. IfÍglúands Ini;.
Gtoup and Notthwestem ltla-
tíonal Cas ualty Company,
(Settled) MTLÂ Member Gary
Zzdick,Seventh Judicial Dis trict,
Wibaux County, Cause No. DV-10.
Lawrence Goroski was killed
while a passenger in a single-car ac-
cident. Goroski had eight separate
vehicles covered under a single pol-
icy for which he paid eight separate
premiums fot UIM and Med Pay
coverage. Gary Zadick sued to
stack the coverages. Subsequently,
Gary drafted and showed to the
carcíer an excellent brief on motion
for summary judgment after which
the case settled without filing the
bdef. Again, I have cited exten-
sively from his brief but urge mem-
bers to read the entire brief, posted
on the MTLA website, along with
the other fine stacking brieß posted
there for the members' benefit.
Ilady v. Ptogressíve Spe-
cialty Ins. Co., (Summary iudg-
ment decision pending) MTLÂ
member Kent Duckworth. Federal
District Court, Missoula Division
fMolloy], Cause No. CV-01-130-M-
DWM.
Progressive charged the se-
verely injured insured three sepa-
rate premiums for 50,000 UIM lim-
its for each of three separate vehi-
cles insured under the same policy.
When the company refused to stack
the UIM coverages, Kent fltled suit
and moved for summary iudgment.
FìIban v. USAA Casualty
Ins. Co. (Summary judgment deci-
sion pending) MTLA member
Cathy Lewis. ErghthJudicial Dis-
trict, Cascade County, No. ADV
01-83ó. fMcKittrick]
Filban and Scoggins \¡r'ere
killed in a head-on collision with
Maki, who was headed the wrong
way on I-15 at Hardy, Montana.
Filban had three vehicles under one
USA,A. policy with three separate
premiums for UIM and for Med
Pzy coverage, which also included
seatbelt/airbag and death benefits.
Iæwis sued the carriet and briefed
cross-motlons for summary judg-
ment.
Mitchell v. State Farm fns.
Co., (Decision pending) ¡lTL,\
member Steve Fletcher, Montariâ
Supreme Court No. 02-052.
Chades Mitchell was severely
injured as a passenger in a single car
accident in Montana onJanuary 27,
1998. He covered five vehicles un-
der separate State Farm policies is-
sued in Califomia and paid separate
premiums for UM and UIM cover-
age. The Fourth Judicial District
court in Missoula County applied
Califomia law in spite of the l{emp
v. Allstate fns. Co.8 and Young-
blood v. American Starcs fns,
Co.e decisions and upheld the car-
rier's defìnition of UIM to find no
coverage. Cahfomiahas an anti-
stacking stâhrte and a statutory defi-
nition of UIM that defeats the cov-
erage entirely n marry cases. The
case is on appeal to the Montana
Supreme Court and under review by
the Âmicus Committee of MTLA.
O ther case s: DougMarshall
told me some time ago that he was
briefrrg a case filed in the Butte Di-
vision of the Montana Federal Dis-
trict Court. He was planningattacks
on the statute for separation of
powers, impairment of conuactual
oblþtions, denial of equal protec-
tion and substantive due process.
Mick McKeon reported havtngz
s tacking case against Progressive,
Dan Bidegaray indicated last April
that he and Mike Cok were pressing
to stack Med Pay limits in a State
Farm case. He said Mike George
was also pressing a stacking case at
that time. Larry Grubbs reported he
was filing suit in a case seeking to
stack GEICO policy UM and Med
Pay limits. He said his partner, Mike
Eiselein, was also handling a stack-
ing case. Dale McGarvey indicated
many months ago that he had six
cases involving stacking and was
fast tracking one case in particular. I
believe Alan læmer has one or more
cases going and, inJuly, Roland Du-
rocher reported he was pursuing a
case involving stacking of UM and
Med Pay coverage on four State
Farm policies. Richard Rarnler ar-
gued a stacking case before Judge
Guenther in Gallatin County in De-
cember. He said he incoqporated
substantial portions ofJoe Bot-
tomly's brief. Finally,Gary Rice re-
ported working on a stacking case
involving Farmers Insurance Com-
pany. I do not know the present
status of these cases but report them
for nenvorking putposes.
THE ARGUMENTS FOR
STACKING
Cathy læwis, in her brief in the
Fílban case, provides a thorough
history of stacking coverages in
Montana, especially noting that the
Montana courts hzve an unbroken
chain of public policy statements in
rcgard to assuring coverage for
which the insured pud a separate
premium. This historical context is
important for the arguments that
follow.
Argument The carrier failed to
"clearþ inform or noti$ the in-
sured in writing of the limits of
the coverage with respect to the
premium charged" as required in
MCA S 33-23-203 (3).
Gary Zadick,in Goroski, as-
serts that before the 1997 anti-
stacking statute, Montana cases
made clear that stacking of portable
coverages, UM, UIM, and MedPa¡
was the "benefit of the bargain" for
auto insurance consurners. Insrlrers
knew that anti-stacking language in
"limits of liability" clauses in their
policies was invalid by reason of
public policy in the state. Because
the statute changed the benefits, the
legislature recognized the impor-
tance of notice to the insureds. Ac-
cordingly, subsection (3) of the 1997
anti-stacking statute required the in-
surers to 'hotifi the insured in writ-
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ing of the limits of the coverage
with respect to the premium
charged."
Zadick rn Gorc skÍ argaed:
'Defendant insurer failed to give
notice to the insured that for the
same premium charged on each of
eight vehicles, the insurer was only
going to extend one singfe underin-
sured limit and one single medical
expense limit. The failute to give
the notice is contrary to the above-
quoted statute and invalidates the
attempted renewal on less favonble
tems." Zzdick argues this was criti-
cal in light of the previous public
policy statements ìn Bennett u.
State Fatm Mut. Auto. fns. Co.rlo
Ruckdashchel v. State Fatm
Mut. Auto. fns. Co.rtt Farmerc
AIIíance Mutual v. Ifolemant2
and Grier v. Nationwide Mut.
fns. Co.r3 that separate benefits be
provided when separate premiums
are charged. Lewis similady argued
that those cases gave rise to the
customer's "reasonable expecta-
tion" that the coverage could be
stacked increasing the need for no-
tice.
Zadickalso bases his notice
argument on MCA S 33-15-1106,
which requires insurers to give 30-
day notice before a policy teffn ex-
pires of any change by which the
policy will be renewed "on less fa-
vorable terms." That the coverages
could not now be stacked was
cleady a less favorable term in Oc-
tober of L997.The covrt ln Tho-
mas v. lt{otthwestem Nad. fns.
Co.t+ rndicated that insurance con-
srüners expect the same coverage
upon renewal unless they are given
conspicuous notification of change.
Furthermore, the court, n Tho-
masrheld that insurance consum-
ers were not obligated to read the
renewal policy. Failure to grve ap-
propriate notice estopps the carrier
from denying the benefits.
Joe Bottornly similady argues
that the canier must give notice
that the limits of coverage with re-
spect to the premium charged will
be $0.00 for each additional policy
where the carrier intends to block
stacking of coverage. Instead, the
declarations pages lead the con-
sumer to believe full limits o[each
coverage are avulable for each pre-
mium. As Bottomly's brief says, if
"the premiums Charles paid for UM
and UIM coverage entitled him to
nothing [for the additional cover-
ages], then he should have been so
informed. He was not." Addition-
ally, the brief points outÍhat Ben-
nett v. State Fanfls held that the
insuter's basic insuring agreement
"unambiguously provides an in-
sured a reasonable expectation to
recover damages up to the limit of
both policies under which she was
an insuted and for which separate
premiums had been paid."
Argumenü A policy provision
blocking sacking of UM cover-
age is void as a violation of MCA
s 33-23-201.
Bottornly,'tn Cameton argues
that, if the carcier is blocking stack-
ing of UM coverage by using afam-
ily exclusion, then that exclusion
violates the UM statute MCA S 33-
23-207. The Montana Supremè
Court treats UM coverage as a com-
pulsory coverage required by stat-
ute,16 so that it cannot be dimin-
ished below the statutory minimum
by a policy provision.
Argumenü The carrier failed to
inform the insured "whether the
coverage from one policy or mo-
tor vehicle may be added to the
coverege of another policy or
motor vehicle" as required in
MCA S 33-23-203 (3).
Bottomly, ln Cameton, drs-
sects the notice sent by State Farm
to show that it really doesn't give
the statutory notice required but in-
stead, refers back to the policy lan-
guage which is in fact an exclusion
(family), not ari anti-stacking provi-
sion. Jarussi, tn lfancock, argues
that the purported notice given by
Farmer's Alliance Mutual that cov-
erages for UM, UIM, and Med Pay
could not be stacked could be read
by the consurner to meari that he
could not add his UM, UIM, and
Med Pay coverage under the same
policy. He cites additional conflict-
ing intelpretations and concludes
that the notice is deficient under the
statute.
Argumenü A policy provision re-
stricting coverage to only one
limit where multiple premiums
have been paid is not a
"reasonable limitation" author-
ized by the statute.
This argument was advanced
by Gene Jarussi tn Ifancock.He
contended that UM and UIM cover-
ages, being portable like life insur-
aflce,are personal and follow the
insured regardless of whether he is a
pedestrian, passenger, or driver at
the time of the accident. To allow
the insured to buy multiple cover-
zges,p^y multiple premiums and
then, by "limitation of liability" pro-
vision, restrict him to one limit is
not a "reâsonable limit" as allowed
by the statute.
Judge Cybulski so ruled in
.Farmets Allíance Mutual v. Ifan-
cockl1 on September 8,2000. Gary
Zadickand Cathy Iæwis also argue
this point in their briefs relying on
Cybulski's decision. Kent
Duckworth makes the same argu-
ment in ll^tdy v. Ptogressive.
ArgumenÍ The insurer simpþ
g ve nonotice
This is ari argument fact spe-
cific to each case. Laura Christoffer-
son, briefìng on behalf of the in-
suted, Daniel Olson, tnthe Ifan-
cockcase argued, after review of the
facts, that the insurer simply gave no
notice. With regard to the insurer's
puqported notice, she said:
This notice is not directed to
Mr. Olson specifically, does
not state what the limits of
the covetage are or were with
regard to his vehicles, what
the premium is nor does it
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cleady define what effect this
change may have upon Mr.
Olson. There is no indication
when the notice was sent or
that lv{r. Olson even received
or whether it was actually
sent to him.
Christofferson noted that
shortly after the enactment of the
statute there were policy renewals to
which the statute applied with no
notice given the insured so he could
increase his limits for his protection
if he chose.
Argument A policy contract that
requires multiple premiums for
multiple coverages but restricts
the benefit to a single limit is un-
conscionable.
Zadickasserts that the Court
tn Leibnnd v. l{ational Fatmerc
Union Prcp. & Cas.18 indicated
that the unconscionability doctrine
of the Uniform Commercial Code
can be applied to insurance policy
contracts. He says the two-fold test
for unconscionability is (1) contrac-
tual terms unreasonably fzvonble
to the drafter and Q) no meanngfirl
choice on the part of the other
paty regarding acceptance of the
provi sion. Zadick contends that
policies providrng for multiple pre-
miums and restricting benefits to a
single limit meet this test. Note that
this argument avoids getting tangled
in or challenging the statute.
Similady,læwis cites the 9ù
Circuit's decision upholding Judge
Molloy's frnding of unconscionabil-
ity n Ticlnor v. Choice lfotels,
fn(I, fnc.ro for the proposiúon
that, in Montana, it requires "a ftnd-
ing that the contract: 1) was one of
adhesion; 2) was not within rhe
weaker pary's teasonable expecta-
tions, or 3) if within its expecta-
tions, it was unduly opptessive, un-
conscionable or against public pol-
icy." She builds her argument on
insurance standardized forms, take-
it-or-leave-it offers, unequal bar-
gaimng position, and the insured's
reasonable expectations to argue
that anti-stacking contracts are un-
conscionable if the insurer collects
multrple ptemiums.
Argumenfi Policies providing
multiple coverages for separate
premiums but restricting benefits
to a single limit should be re-
formed by the court in equity.
Zadick,in Gotoski, notes that
MC,{ S 28-2-1.677 gives a court the
power to reform 2'cofitract "due to
mutual mistake, unilateral mistake,
or fraud." FIe notes that the insurers
continued to charge multiple premi-
ums when they had "presumably
made a corporate decision to no
longer stack benefits." The multiple
premiums paid were consideration
for an agregate limit, and a similar
premium had been charged in ptevi-
ous years for limits that could be
stacked. It is unlikely that the in-
sured wanted or expected a reduc-
tion to a fuac¡ton of his former cov-
erage for the same premium. Zzdtck
argues that these facts at most es-
tablish fraud and, at least, establish
unilateral mistake. Hence, he sub-
mits that the contract should be re-
formed to provide a single premium
and a single a gregate limit of liabil-
ity. One caflargüe that this ap-
proach does not seek to stack but
only to reform the contract, so that
it is not in derogatron of the anti-
stacking statute.
Argument The policy doesn't
really prohibit sacking and,
therefore, falls under the
ttprovides otherwisett exception
to the anti-stacking statute.
læwis, n rhe Filban case, zt-
gr"res that carefirl reading of USA,A.'s
"limit of liability" clause shows it
does not actually block stacking.
The anti-stacking statute starts \¡/ith
this exception: "Unless a motor ve-
hicle liability policy specifically pro-
vides otherwise. . ." If the policy
doesn't block stacking, then it
'þrovides otherwise" and the statute
doesn't apply. Similarly, Gene Ja-
russi atgues ìn lfancockthat Farm-
ers Alliance Mutual's limit ofliability
clause doesn't actually preclude
stacking of UIM coverage so that it
falls in the exception created by the
statute. In several ofthe cases filed,
counsel have carefully studied the
offending provisions to see if they
are ambiguous, don't appl¡ or don't
on their face do what the insurer
thinks they do. The arguments are
too specific and voluminous to
cover here. Suffice it to say that
such careful analysis needs to be
paftof ezch challenge. I note that
Iæwis has a good section on court
construction of ambiguity in her
brief as do Zadtck and Duckworth.
Argument The anti-sacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of separation of powers.
Bottornly argues the statute
"interferes with the proper sepaø.
tion of powers between the court
and the legislature. He says the legis-
lature's mandate that "the limits of
insurance coverage available under
each oart of the oolicv must be de-
termined as follows . . ." requires a
specific interpretation of the con-
úactand usurps the power of the
court to interpret contracts thereby
violating Art. VII, $ 1, which vests
all judicial power of the state in the
courts. That section also forbids
persons "charged with the exercise
of power propedy belonging to one
branch" to exercise "any power
properly belonging to either of the
others . . ." G^ty Zzdìck, n the
Gotoski brief doesn't raise constitu-
tional challenges but makes z grcat
statement of the court's role in in-
terpreting contracts.
Argumenû The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of equal protection.
Bottonrly argues the statute
violates equal protection of Ärt. II,
$ 4, because the statute treats simi-
larly situated individuals (those who
bought identical coverages) differ-
ently. He notes that, under the stat-
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ute, the arnount of UM or UIM cov-
erage the insured actually gets de-
pends on the coverage of the car
rnvolved in the accident and not the
insurance the insured purchased. He
argues as follows: The court must
zpply a compelling state interest test
for constitutionality. One of the
"inalienable dghts" in Ärt. II, $ 3 is
the right to pursue life's necessities,
and insurance benefits âre a neces-
sity, making securing the benefits of
insurance a fundamental right re-
quiring a compelling state interest to
make the statute valid. Even if the
statute does not affectz fundamen-
tal interest, it must pass the naonø)
basis test, which it cannot do. Bot-
tomly compares lIeisúer v. Ifines
Motor Co.,20 whidn found violation
of equal protection where one class
of insureds had the rþht to choose a
treating physician while another cre-
ated by the statute did not. The
court there held reducing costs of
insurance to be an illegitimate pur-
pose for the statute.
I submit that another avenue
to argue denial of equal protectron is
to compare that class of insurance
consulners who buy all of the per-
sonaì potable life insurance they
wish and are secure in the benefits,
with that class that similady pur-
chases all tJre UM, UIM, and Med
Pay personal portable auto insurarÌce
they wish. The anti-stacking statute
deprives the latter class of the bene-
frt of all but one policy coverage.
Argument: The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of inalienable right to
protect property and pursue life's
necessities.
Bottomly's brief cites Art. II,
$ 3, for its "inalienable rights" which
ìnclude "the rights of pursuinglife's
basic necessities, enjoying and de-
fending their lives and liberties, ac-
quiring, possessing and protecting
property, and seeking their safety,
health and happiness in all lawful
ways." It argues that securing insur-
ance benef,rts is such a right, which
the statute abroga.tes without com-
pelling intereSt or even a rational
basis. ,\s the argument is developed,
"The statute unilaterally prevents a
person from recovering damages to
himself and his family for which he
has paid.It thereby impairs the indi-
vidual's right to protect these inal-
ienable rights."
Argument: The anti-stacking stat-
ute is unconstitutional for viola-
tion of substantive due process.
Bottornly bases this argument
on Art. II, $ 17's guarantee of due
process of law. In NewuÍúIe v.
State Dept. ofFamily Seruices2T
and Plumb v. FourthJudícia|
District22 the Montana Supreme
Court developed the test that re-
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strictions placed on remedies and
procedures must be reasonable
when balanced against the puqpose
of the legislature in enacting the
statute. The means chosen by the
legislature must be reasonably re-
lated to the result sought. The stat-
ute here is an unreasonable restric-
tion not rationally related to a legrti-
mate govemment putpose.
Argumenû The anti-stacking
statute is unconstitutional for
violation of the right to full legal
redress.
Bottornly argues that r\rt. II,
$16 provides aright to "frrll legal
redress" whuch the court found to
be fundamental tn Pfost v. State.23
Though it later held the right was
not fundamental in Meech v.Ifill
IIaven Wesq fnc.r2+ he argues that
subsequent to Meech,in
Wadsworth v. Statés and MEIC
v. Dept. ofEnuironmental Qual-
iqrrze ¡t" covft,again indicates that
rights found in the Declaratron of
Rights of the Montana Constitution
are "fundamental,." From this he
argues that the statute violates a fun-
damental right of legal redress by
depriving the insured of his or'her
right to have the courts interpret the
insurance contract on issues of
stacking.
The Bottomly brief integrates
the constituúonal issues described
above into a single atgument, but
each constitutional violation is well
addressed.
Argument The anti-sacking
statute is unconstitutional
because it impairs the obligation
of contracts.
Loren Toole kt lfancockcites
Art. II, $ 33 for the proposition that
"No. . .law impairing the obligation
ofcontracts. . . shall be passed by
the legislature." He a(gues that the
legislature has attempted to create a
"limitation of liability under motor
vehicle liability policy" and has
thereby impaired the contracts.
The statute's drafters tried to avoid
this impairment by not applying the
anti-stacking provisions to then ex-
isting policy contracts during their
tems.
I suggest that the argument
that the anti-stacking statute impairs
contracts should be bolstered by
argurng further that auto insurance
is marketed in the form of automati-
cally renewable contracts. All the
consumer does is continue to pay
premiums on the same periodic ba-
sis and the contract is renewed with-
out any further application, disclo-
sures or sþatures. (fhis should be
the subject of judicial notice.) This
was implicitly recognized in Tho-
mas v. hlotthwestern Natíonal
fns, Co.27 in which the court noted
that the consumer assumes the con-
tract is being renewed on the same
terms and doesn't even have a duty
to read the renewa.l policy. Prior to
the effectìve date of the anti-
stacking contract, these ongoing re-
newable contracts were governed by
Montana case law that allowed the
consumer the benefit of receiving
the limit of UM, UIM, or Med Pay
coverage for each vehicle for which
she had paid apremium. Even after
the 1981 antì-stacking statute
blocked stacking for multiple autos
insured under the same policy, com-
panies like State Farm still freely
chose to place their insured's vehi-
cles under separate renewable policy
contracts and charge separate premi-
ums. They continued to do so even
after the Montana Supreme Court
ruled such practices rendered their
contract benefìts stackable. In this
context of renewable continuing
policy contracts that provided for
muluple premiums and multiple re-
coveries, the legislature passed a
statute mandating that all such con-
tracts would be interpreted to pro-
vide only a single lirrut where the
insured paid multiple premiums.
This is the unconstitutronal impair-
ment of the contracts.
ArgumenÍ If the insurer collects
multiple premiums when the
statute and the policy say there
can be no multiple benefits, then
the insurer should be equiably
estopped from refusing the full
stacked benefits.
Steve Fletcher in one section
of his brief in rhe MítcheII case ât
the Montana Supreme Court, makes
an intriguing altemative argument.
If the language of the statute and
the policy contract prohibiting mul-
tiple coverages is valid, then the car-
rier's act of charging multiple premi-
ums should be an unlawfi.il act.
Steve argues that the carrier who
does so should be estopped from
denying benefits. This line of argt-
ment merits further development
because one could avoid challenging
the statute or policy provisions and
even base the argument on as-
sumed- [o r-the-sake-o fl-argument
validity.
Argument The anti-sacking
stâtute only applies to prevent
stacking "to prevent payments
for the same element of loss.
Pat Sheehy would add this ar-
gument, which he points out
"allows the court to intelpret the
anti-stacking statute according to its
tems." He argues that the over-
arching intent and pulpose of the
statute, "to prevent duplicate pay-
ments for the same element of
loss," is stated in subsectron (2).
Sheehy says: "The legislature was
passing the antì-stacking statute to
prevent people from buying multi-
ple coverages and then collecting
twice for medical bills or other
losses from the same claim." He
concludes, the statute should not
apply when the damages of the in-
sured far exceed any single lirrut un-
der any single coverage. Then, it is
important that the insureds get the
stacked coverage they paid for to
cover all their damages.
DEALING WITH TH.E CTIRIS.
TENSON V. MOUNTAIN
V/EST FARM BUREAAMUT.
INS.28 CASE
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The recent (2000) Chtistenson case
involved a newly acquirecl auto for which
the owner purchased a new and separate
policy with Mountain West because her
daughter would be drivrng the car. The
owner's infant granddaughter was severely
injured as a passenger ur the car and was
covered for BI coverage under the auto's
new policy. The real issue was whether the
BI coverage on the owner's prior policy
covering her other cats with Mountain
West would include the auto under the
prior policy's "after acquired vehicle" pro-
vision. The court's pfunary holdingwas
that the auto was an "aîter acquired vehi-
cle," so the BI coverage would apply. How-
ever, the court then dealt with the question
whether the resulting BI policy coverages
with Mountain West could be "stacked."
The court noted the parallel between the
policy's anti-stacking language in its limita-
tion of liability clause and the language of
the anti-stacking statute, MCA S 33-23-203
and held that the policies could not be
stacked. The case is touted as a principal
line of defense in the insurer's briefs.
Gary Zadick and Cathy Lewis make
the following arguments regarding Chris-
tensofr
The case involved stacking of BI cov-
erages not the personal and portable UM,
UIM, and Med Pay coverages.
Multiple premiums were not paid in
Christenson since no premium was paid
for the new vehicle under the first policy.
The decision doesn't address the re-
quirement of notice of renewal on less fa-
vorable terms of S 33-15-1106 or the notice
requirement of $ 33-23-203.
The decision doesn't discuss the re-
quirement that the policy limitatìon be a
"reasonable hmitation under $ 33-23-203 ot
the public policy that prevents an insurer
from charg'ing multiple premiums for a sin-
gle coverage.
There was no discussion of the un-
conscionability of the policy.
The policy did not allow stacking as
opposed to some that arguably do.
Kent Duckworth also chaJlenges ap-
plicability of Chris tenson atgùng thzt it
doesn't apply where the coverage is per-
sonal portable insurance since Chtisten-
son involved BI coverage that is virtually
never stacked.
The important thing to remember about Christenson is that
most of the arguments described in this article were not raised
there. The court simply found that the anti-stackinglanguage of the
policy involved comported with the language of the anti-stacking
case and applied the statute to block stacking of BI coverage. It re-
mains for counsel to develop the best arguments challenging the
statute and the anti-stacking provisions of the policies.
CONCLUSION
The origrnaliry and creativity exhibited in the variety of argu-
ments challenging the antr-stacking staüte and its application is a
testament to the seriousness with which Montana trial lawyers take
their duty to represent their injured clients. It is an honor to review
and summarize the persuasive advocacy of our brothers and sisters
on the stacking issue. They have done us all a favotby sharing their
arguments with MontanaTrialTrcnd¡ for publicatron and by allow-
rng their briefs to be placed on the MTLA website. Counsel brief-
ing a stacking issue need to thoroughìy develop precise, persuasive,
and credible arguments because his or her case may be the one that
ends up at the Montana Supreme Court and ultimately makes the
law for everJone. Given the importance of the stacking issue,
counsel should notify the MTLA ,\micus Committee if z case tn-
volving a stacking issue is appealed to the Montana Supreme Court.
No issue could have a broader and greater ftnancid, impact on the
recovery of injured persons than the issue of the legality of the
anti-stacking statute.
As always, I thank Pat Sheehy and Gary Zadtck for their rn-
valuable review and comment on this article.
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